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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(h)(2008). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Review of Trial Court's Factual Findings 
a. A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 
Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). For a reviewing court to 
find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court 
are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994), holding modified in. State v. Levin. 
144 P.3d 1096 (Utah 2006). This standard is highly deferential to the trial 
court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and 
the evidence is adduced. IdL The judge of that court is therefore considered 
to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a 
sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope 
to gamer from a cold record. IcL 
b. In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
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in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Chen v. Stewart. 
100 P.3d 1177,1184 (Utah 2004). If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, 
the reviewing court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the 
evidence. Id. 
c. In the absence of a transcript, reviewing courts cannot determine whether the 
findings were based upon sufficient evidence and will presume the correctness 
of the findings made by the trial court. Meyers v. Meyers. 2005 UT App. 50. 
Absent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of error [in trial court's findings] 
is "merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which [the Utah Court of 
Appeals] cannot resolve." Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah. 794 P.2d 847, 
849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v. Smedley. 
792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
Review of Trial Court's Legal Conclusions 
d. The trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial 
interests of the parties to a divorce and its actions are entitled to a presumption 
of validity. Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
e. Whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177,1184 (Utah 
2004). The application of a legal standard, once articulated, involves varying 
degrees of discretion depending on the standard in question. In Re Estate of 
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Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347-48 (Utah 1994). In cases where meeting the 
legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, reviewing courts should give trial 
courts considerable discretion in determining whether the facts of a particular 
case come within the established rule of law. See id Even where the 
appellant purports to challenge only the legal ruling, if a determination of 
correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-
sensitive, the appellant also has a duty to marshal the evidence. Chen, 100 
P.3d at 1184-85. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented in this brief pertaining to the trial court's determinations were 
preserved by the evidence and testimony at trial and Mrs. Thompson's Post-Trial 
Memorandum of Points and Legal Authorities. (R. 157-59; R. 160-72). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES. 
ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) (2008): 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (2008): 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
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including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. A bench trial was held in this matter on January 29,2008 before the Honorable 
G. Rand Beacham. (R. 157). 
2. On the date of trial, Mrs. Thompson took the witness stand to testify at 
approximately 9:33 a.m., and testified, with recesses being taken, until approximately 2:19 
p.m. (14) 
3. Mr. Thompson thereafter took the witness stand commencing at approximately 
2:20 p.m. (Id.) Mr. Thompson testified, with recesses being taken, until 5:00 p.m. (Id.) 
4. During the course of the trial, approximately 31 Exhibits were admitted into 
evidence. (R. 158-59). 
5. On April 11, 2008, Judge Beacham signed his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Addendum 1; R. 205-11). 
6. In making his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Beacham stated 
as follows: 
The Court has considered the testimonies of the witnesses, the 
exhibits received into evidence, the arguments of counsel and 
the parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Neither party's proposals were entirely acceptable to the Court. 
Accordingly, the Court now makes its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Footnote omitted). 
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(Addendum 1 at 1;R. 205). 
7. The Court went on to make the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: 
MARITAL HOME 
5. At the time of the parties' marriage in 2002, Respondent 
owned a home in California which was his sole property. 
6. During the next two or three years of marriage, Petitioner 
acquired some community property interest in Respondent's 
California home, but the evidence before the Court does not 
allow this to be quantified. 
7. When the parties moved to Utah in 2005, Respondent 
sold the California home and the parties jointly purchased a 
home in St. George, Utah. 
8. Title to the Utah home was and is held by both parties as 
joint tenants, and is subject to a joint obligation for a debt 
secured by a trust deed. 
9. The earnest money and down payment on the Utah home 
totaled more than $80,000, and both were paid with funds from 
the proceeds of the sale of Respondent's premarital home in 
California. 
10. The Utah home is a marital asset, in which each party is 
entitled to an equitable share, because the California home 
proceeds have been commingled into the marital estate [Dunn 
v. Dunn is the correct precedent] and because Petitioner had 
some community property interest in the proceeds of the 
California home 
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12. The Utah home should be sold and the net proceeds 
divided equally between the parties; in the alternative, either 
party should be allowed to purchase the interest of the other 
party for $62,000 within the next six months after the entry of 
the final Decree of Divorce. 
40IK ACCOUNT 
13. Respondent's 401k retirement account had a value of 
$68,784 at the time of the parties' marriage in 2002. 
14. The 401k account had a value of $177,302 at the time of 
trial. 
15. The difference of $108,518 accumulated during the 
marriage and as marital property [Jeffries v. Jeffries is the 
correct precedent] and Petitioner should be awarded one half of 
that accumulated amount. 
(Addendum 1 at ff 5-15; R. 206-07). 
8. On May 21,2008, the trial court entered a Decree of Divorce pursuant to and 
consistent with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 212). 
9. Mr. Thompson initiated this appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 
2008. (R.224). 
10. In violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(c) and (e)(1), Mr. 
Thompson did not request a transcript of any parts of the proceedings, nor did he file a 
certificate with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court 
indicating that no parts of the transcript of the proceedings was to be requested. Utah R. 
App. P. 11(c), (e)(1) (2008). (See Judgment Role and Index, attached as Addendum 2 at 2-
6 
3). 
11. Also in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(c) and (e)(2), Mr. 
Thompson failed to include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding 
or conclusion Mr. Thompson intends to urge on appeal is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence. UtahR. App.P. 11(c), (e)(1) (2008). (See Judgment Role and Index, attached 
as Addendum 2 at 2-3). 
12. In the absence of a transcript of the testimony given by the parties at trial, Mr. 
Thompson supports much of the "Statement of Material Facts" portion of his Appellate Brief 
by citing to an unverified trial brief that was prepared by his counsel. (Brief of the Appellant 
at 3-7; R. 193-204). 
13. Of the 35 total paragraphs in Mr. Thompson's "Statement of Material Facts," 
the following are based exclusively upon the unverified trial brief which bears no evidentiary 
value for purposes of this appeal: 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 21, 22, 25, 30, and 31. (Brief of the 
Appellant at 3-7). 
14. The following paragraphs in Mr. Thompson's "Statement of Material Facts" 
are based, at least in part, on Mr. Thompson's trial brief: 9,11,12,18,19,20,23,26, and 28. 
(Id) 
15. Further, in the "Argument" portion of Mr. Thompson's Appellate Brief, he 
states and relies on factual assertions, citing only to the trial brief or to nothing at all. (Id at 
10-17). For example, Mr. Thompson makes the following factual allegations unsupported 
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by any evidence: 
a. During the course of the marriage, it was undisputed that 
Mr. Thompson continued to make financial contributions to the 
same 401k account through his employment. (IdL at 11). 
b. Additionally, Mrs. Thompson did not, by her own efforts, 
augment, maintain, or protect Mr. Thompson's premarital 
contributions in any way. (Id.) 
c. In the instant case, Mr. Thompson acquired the California 
home as his sole and separate property. (Id at 15). 
d. Mr. Thompson owned and lived in the California home 
prior to the marriage. (Id.) 
e. Even after the marriage, Mr. Thompson continued to 
make all financial contributions for the maintenance and 
mortgage payments secured by the California home. (Id.) 
f. The Trial Court, however, made a finding, but without 
any supporting evidence, that Mrs. Thompson somehow 
acquired "some community property interest" in Mr. 
Thompson's California home. (Id.) 
g. During the marriage, Mr. Thompson continued to be the 
sole contributor to the maintenance and mortgage payments 
secured by the Utah home. (Id. at 15-16). 
h. Mrs. Thompson did not make any financial contributions 
to maintenance, upkeep or mortgage payments. (Id. at 16). 
16. Indeed, nowhere in Mr. Thompson's brief does he ever support any of his 
factual allegations by citations to actual trial testimony from the parties' one-day trial, as Mr. 
Thompson did not request a transcript of the trial. (See id. at 1-17). 
17. While Mr. Thompson did not request a copy of the transcript, the following 
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documents were admitted into evidence, which, along with the parties' testimony, supports 
the trial court's factual determinations. On or about January 20, 2005, the parties jointly 
entered into a real estate purchase contract to acquire the St. George home at issue in this 
matter. (R. 158 at Exhibit 2). On April 18, 2005, Mr. Thompson signed a warranty deed 
conveying title of the St. George home from Mr. Thompson's name individually to himself 
and Mrs. Thompson as husband and wife and as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. 
(R. 158 at Exhibit 5). On August 24,2006, the parties jointly executed a uniform residential 
loan application to jointly refinance the debt associated with the St. George home. (R. 158 
at Exhibit 6). The parties successfully refinanced the debt associated with the St. George 
home in the amount of approximately $331,400.00, and both parties signed a note making 
them jointly liable for the debt. (R. 158 at Exhibit 7). The parties also signed a deed of trust 
pertaining to the note on August 24,2006 securing the joint obligation with the jointly owned 
St. George home. (R. 158 at Exhibit 8). In Mr. Thompson's responses to interrogatories 
which were entered into evidence at trial as Exhibit 17, Mr. Thompson admitted that the debt 
associated with the marital home in the amount of approximately $331,400.00 was marital 
debt. (R. 158 at Exhibit 17 p.7). 
18. At the beginning of the parties' marriage, Mr. Thompson had a 401(k) 
retirement plan through his employment with a value of approximately $68,784.00 as of 
March 31, 2002. (R. 158 at Exhibit 22 ). At the time of the divorce trial, the value of the 
401(k) account was approximately $177,302. (R. 159 at Exhibit 23). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
SUMMARY OF SECTION I 
A trial court, in dividing a marital estate upon divorce, is not obligated as a matter of 
Utah law to "back out" alleged separate property. This Count has determined that separate 
property may lose its character as separate when it is commingled into the marital estate, or 
when it loses its identity as separate. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In dividing a marital estate, trial courts are to first categorize the parties' property as 
part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Then, each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty 
percent of the marital property. Id. In this matter, the trial court properly characterized the 
assets at issue as marital property, and correctly determined to equally divide the marital 
portion of such assets. 
SUMMARY OF SECTION II 
The Court made factual determinations based on the testimonies of the parties and the 
evidence received at trial that the assets at issue in this appeal are marital property. For Mr. 
Thompson to properly challenge such factual determinations of the trial court, Mr. Thompson 
had an obligation under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 (e)(2) (2008) to provide a 
transcript of the testimony given during the parties' one-day trial. However, Respondent 
failed to provide a transcript, and, as such, the trial court's factual determinations and fact 
intensive legal determinations should be affirmed on appeal. See; Horton v. Gem State Mut. 
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of Utah, 974 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In addition, Mr. Thompson failed to 
marshal the evidence as required under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (2008). 
Mr. Thompson's "Statement of Material Facts" and "Argument" sections of his Brief are 
based, in large part, on self-serving allegations of fact that are unsupported by any actual 
evidence or testimony given at trial. Due to Mr. Thompson's failure to marshal the evidence, 
this Court is again without sufficient basis to review the factual determinations and the fact 
intensive legal determinations of the trial court, which should therefore be affirmed. Chen 
v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
SUMMARY OF SECTION III 
The trial court properly awarded Mr. Thompson his premarital portion of his 401(k) 
retirement plan and divided the marital portion equally. The trial court's determination of 
the marital portion of Mr. Thompson's 401(k) retirement plan is consistent with Utah case 
law. Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 
P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
SUMMARY OF SECTION IV 
The trial court properly found that the parties' St. George home is marital property 
with its equity subject to equal division. The trial court found that the proceeds from the sale 
of Mr. Thompson's California home were commingled into the marital estate. (Addendum 
1 at ^[10; R. 206-07). Separate property may lose its character as separate when it is 
commingled into the marital estate, or when it loses its identity as separate. Burt v. Burt, 799 
11 
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This Court has never created a bright-line test that 
would have required the trial court to credit Mr. Thompson the proceeds from the sale of his 
California home. Rather, the trial court's determination that the proceeds from said sale were 
commingled into the marital estate, and therefore subject to equal division, is in line with 
legal standards set forth by this Court. Id; Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO PRECEDENT IN UTAH LAW THAT A TRIAL COURT MUST 
"BACK OUT" ALLEGED SEPARATE PROPERTY INTERESTS AS UTAH 
LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ONE 
PARTY CAN BECOME MARITAL SUBJECT TO EQUAL DIVISION. 
The crux of Mr. Thompson's argument in this appeal is that the trial court was 
required to "back out" Mr. Thompson's alleged premarital property prior to dividing the 
parties' marital estate. Nowhere in Utah law is there such a bright-line test that requires trial 
courts in divorce matters to apply such a methodology in dividing a marital estate. Whether 
property is marital or separate is a fact intensive issue that is dependant on the particular 
circumstances of each case. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) 
("The appropriate treatment of property brought into a marriage by one may vary from case 
to case."). 
This Court has provided a methodology trial courts are to follow when confronted 
with marital estates involving claims of separate property and marital property. Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct App. 1990); Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1322-23 (Utah 
12 
Ct. App. 1990). In Burt, this Court stated that a trial court should first properly categorize 
the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the 
other. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. In this matter, the trial court properly categorized the items 
of property at issue in this appeal, a portion of Mr. Thompson's 401(k) and the St. George 
home, as marital property. (See Addendum 1 at f^ 10, f^ 15; R 206-07). Once the trial court 
has found that property is marital, the next step is for the trial court to determine how the 
property should be divided. Burt, 799 P.2d 1172. Each party is presumed to be entitled to 
fifity percent of the marital property. Id. Here, the trial court divided the marital portion of 
Respondent's 401 (k) and the equity in the marital home in St. George equally. Thus, the trial 
court's determinations regarding the division of these marital assets was certainly consistent 
with appellate authority. 
Mr. Thompson's approach ignores that separate property may be consumed and its 
identification as separate property lost through commingling and exchanges. Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Separate property may lose its separate 
distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate, or where 
one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate. IdL Whether 
property has been commingled into the marital estate or otherwise lost its separate character 
is a factual determination for the trial court to make, which is presumed by this Court to be 
correct because this Court lacks the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify. Baker 
v.Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The trial court's findings of fact are 
13 
presumed to be correct, and because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses 
testify, we do not make our own findings of fact."). 
Mr. Thompson relies heavily throughout his brief on the unpublished opinion of 
Hayes v. Hayes, 2006 UT App. 289, which is, incidentally, the only Utah case that has used 
the term "back-out method." In Hayes, this Court stated that "the trial court properly used 
a ' back-out' method to credit Husband's contribution toward the marital property before 
applying the fifty percent presumption." IdL at * 1. At issue in Hayes was whether the trial 
court erred in awarding husband separate financial contributions to the marital estate. IdL 
In affirming the trial court's decision, this Court stated that "the trial court can properly 
subtract the parties1 contributions to the marital property before equally dividing the 
remaining equity." IcL (emphasis added). Mr. Thompson's argument that the trial court 
must use the "back-out method" is not supported by Hayes or any other Utah case. The 
holding in Hayes was that the trial court in that matter did not abuse its discretion by giving 
husband his separate contributions to the marital estate, not that trial courts must do so or risk 
being overturned on appeal. Such absolute rule has never been applied by this Court and 
would not only unreasonably constrain trial courts from exercising their broad discretion in 
dividing marital estates, but would contradict this Court's approach that "[t]he appropriate 
treatment of property brought into a marriage by one may vary from case to case." 
Newmever v. Newmever. 745 P.2d 1276,1277 (Utah 1987). 
Through this appeal, Mr. Thompson is attempting to persuade this Court to substitute 
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its judgment on factual determinations, i.e. the designation of property as marital, which this 
Court cannot do under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). ("Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness."). Mr. Thompson 
attempts to frame his appellate arguments as involving purely legal issues. However, 
whether the property has been properly characterized as separate or marital is fact intensive 
and should not be reviewed in a vacuum as purely a legal issue. As discussed in Section II, 
infra, Mr. Thompson has failed to provide a transcript of the trial, resulting in this Court 
having absolutely no ability to review the testimony given by the parties during their one-day 
trial setting. Thus, this Court has an insufficient record upon which to review the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error. Further, Mr. Thompson has failed to marshal the evidence 
as he is required to do under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). The deficiencies 
in Mr. Thompson's brief are fatal to his appeal because he is attempting to challenge factual 
findings without providing this Court an adequate basis to review such findings. 
II. MR, THOMPSON FAILED TO OBTAIN A TRANSCRIPT OF THE TRIAL 
AND HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN HIS BRIEF, AND ON 
THESE GROUNDS ALONE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. Mr. Thompson did not request a transcript of the trial which results in 
this Court having an inadequate basis to determine whether the trial 
court erred in making its factual and legal determinations. 
As the appellant in the matter, Mr. Thompson had the duty to request a copy of the 
trial transcript. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) (2008) provides that: 
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If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
This Court has determined that '"without all the relevant evidence bearing on the issues 
raised on appeal, as required by Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2), 'we can only presume that the 
judgment was supported by sufficient evidence.'" Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 974 
P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This Court has further staled that "[w]hen an appellant 
argues on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, 
the appellant is required to include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to the 
finding or conclusion." Orem City v. Walton. 2002 UT App. 427. Both the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court have routinely affirmed trial court determinations on the basis that 
appellants have failed to provide a trial transcript. See, e ^ , Burke v. Burke, 773 P.2d 498 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987); Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 
P.2d 447 (Utah 1981); Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utaih 1976); Spanish Fork Citv 
v. Rupper, 2007 UT App. 57; Radl v. Univ. of Utah, 2003 UT App. 164; West Vallev Citv 
v. Pettengill 1999 UT App. 236. 
The success of Mr. Thompson's appeal swings on whether this Court decides that the 
trial court erred in finding the assets in question marital. Mr. Thompson has set forth a self 
serving factual scenario in his "Statement of Material Facts" and "Argument" sections of his 
appellate brief. However, most of Mr. Thompson's factual allegations are based, either in 
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whole or in part, on Mr. Thompson's trial brief which is not in evidence and cannot be relied 
on by this Court as a depiction of the facts in this divorce matter. Lacking a transcript of the 
trial, Mr. Thompson is unable to cite to any testimony received by the trial court that may 
have supported the trial court's determinations. Judge Beacham explicitly stated in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that he relied on "testimonies of the witnesses" in 
making its determinations. (Addendum 1 at p. 1; R. 205). Absent the trial transcript, this 
Court is left without an adequate record of the proceedings to determine whether the trial 
court erred in making its factual findings and applying the law to the fact intense question 
of whether property is marital or separate. Mr. Thompson's claims of error are "merely an 
unsupported, unilateral allegation which this Court cannot resolve." Horton v. Gem State 
Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Mark VII Fin. Consultants 
Corp. v. Smedlev. 792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
Mr. Thompson has the burden of providing this Court with an adequate record to 
preserve his arguments for review. Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah. 794 P.2d 847, 849 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). This Court should determine, as it has done in many previous cases, 
that in light of Mr. Thompson's failure to provide a transcript of the trial proceeding, this 
Court can only presume that the determinations of the trial court were supported by sufficient 
evidence. 
B. Mr. Thompson failed to marshal the evidence as required under the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party 
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challenging a finding of fact must marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. In the absence of an adequate record, an appellant cannot satisfy his burden on 
appeal to marshal the evidence, and this Court cannot perform meaningful appellate review 
of the evidentiary support for the judgment. Orem City v. Carrasco, 2003 UT App. 185; 
Horton v. Gem State Mut. Of Utah. 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Even where a 
party seeks to challenge a legal determination that is based on the application of a legal 
standard that is extremely fact sensitive, the appellant also has a duty to marshal the evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah 2004). Mr. Thompson has failed entirely to 
marshal the evidence in his Brief. 
To properly marshal evidence, the challenging party must "demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004). Where 
an appellant challenges a trial court's rulings on highly fact-dependent issues, like those 
frequently encountered in divorce cases, appellate courts grant broader than normal 
discretion to the trial court. Id. The marshaling requirement is not one that is easily met, in 
fact, the requirements are "rigorous and strict." Id An appellant, in order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, "must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very finding the appellant resists." LdL (quoting Neelv v. Bennett. 51 P.3d 724,727 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2002)). "The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different from that of 
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presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party must 'temporarily remove its own 
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position'; he or she must play the 'devil's 
advocate."' Id (quoting Harding v. Bell 57 P.3d 1093 (Utah 2002)). Appellants must not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case, nor can they merely present 
carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record to support their position. kL Appellants 
are also prohibited from simply restating or reviewing evidence that "points to an alternate 
finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact." Id Further, appellants 
cannot shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings. IcL 
If an appellant fails to meet the marshaling requirement, the appellate court has 
grounds to affirm the trial court's findings on that basis alone. IdL at 1196. An appellant's 
failure to marshal the evidence will result in the appellate court assuming that the evidence 
supports the trial court's findings. Id. 
As discussed previously, the essential question in this appeal is whether property was 
properly characterized by the trial court as marital property subject to equal division. In 
making its determinations, the trial court in this matter clearly relied on the "testimony of the 
parties" given at trial. (Addendum 1, at p.l; R. 205). For Mr. Thompson to show the trial 
court erred in making its findings and conclusions, Mr. Thompson has the marshaling burden 
of presenting, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very finding he resists. Id. Mr. Thompson has made 
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no effort whatsoever to marshal the evidence in his Appellate Brief. Instead, Mr. Thompson 
did exactly what this Court has stated appellants must not do, which is "attempt to construe 
the evidence in a light favorable to their case" and "merely present carefully selected facts 
and excerpts from the record to support their position." Id at 1195. As Mr. Thompson has 
failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should, based on thai factor alone, affirm the trial 
court's determinations at issue on this appeal. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIVIDING EQUALLY THE 
AMOUNT IN MR. THOMPSON'S 401(k) RETIREMENT PLAN THAT 
ACCRUED DURING THE MARRIAGE, 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that 
Respondent's 40 l(k) retirement account had a value of $68,784.00 at the time of the parties' 
marriage. (Addendum 1 at ^ f 13; R. 207). The trial court also found that the 401(k) account 
increased in value to $177,302.00 at the time of trial. (Addendum 1 at % 14; R. 207). The 
trial court then found that "[t]he difference of $ 108,518 accumulated during the marriage and 
is marital property.. ." and awarded Mrs. Thompson one-half of the marital portion of the 
401(k) account. (Addendum 1 at ^  15; R. 207) (emphasis added). As stated above in Section 
II, since Mr. Thompson failed to request a transcript of the trial proceedings, this Court "can 
only presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." Horton v. Gem State 
Mut. of Utah. 974 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Here, the trial court's finding that 
the amount accumulated in Mr. Thompson's 401(k) account is marital property must stand 
because Mr. Thompson has failed to provide this Court with a copy of the transcript from the 
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trial and this Court will not substitute its judgment for the trial court's. Baker v. Baker, 866 
P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to 
be correct, and because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify, we do 
not make our own findings of fact.'5). 
Moreover, it is a firmly established principle that "the interest in a retirement plan 
accrued during marriage is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon 
divorce." Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). In 
the watershed case regarding the division of retirement accounts in divorce cases, Woodward 
v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court determined that the 
"wife is entitled to share in the portion of benefits to which the rights accrued during the 
marriage." 
Mr. Thompson argues in his Appellate Brief that the trial court should not have relied 
on Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Mr. Thompson's argument is 
misplaced. In Jefferies, this Court determined that the husband's 401(a) retirement plan, 
which, for purposes of this matter, is equivalent to a 401(k) plan,1 was marital property. Id. 
at 837-38. In citing previous Utah Supreme Court decisions, including the Woodward 
1
 For purposes of the issue before the Court, the difference between a 401(a) plan 
and a 401(k) plan is of no consequence. A 401(k) plan is essentially a retirement plan 
authorized under title 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2008). Section 401(k)(l) provides that a plan 
will not fail to qualify as a 401(a) plan merely because the plan includes a qualified cash 
or deferred arrangement. The qualified cash or deferred arrangement is essentially a 
program under which an employer may make payments on behalf of the employee to the 
plan. See26U.S.C.401(k)(2)(2008). 
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decision, this Court articulated two important legal principles that justify dividing the amount 
accrued in a 401(a) plan during the marriage upon divorce: 
[T]wo principles are clear from the law of this state. First, all 
assets acquired by the parties during marriage are to be 
considered by the trial court when making an equitable 
distribution, unless the law specifically prevents the Court from 
considering a particular asset. Second, a marital asset is defined 
functionally as any right that has accrued during the marriage to 
a present or future benefit. 
Id at 837. The Court then determined that "[the] funds that accumulated in [husband's] 
401(a) plan during the marriage clearly fit the functional definition of a marital asset." Id. 
This Court further stated that "not only was it proper for the trial court to consider 
[husband's] 401(a) plan as a marital asset, it was required." Id. at 837-38. This Court went 
on to declare that "[we] hold that retirement funds accumulated in a 401(a) plan during 
marriage are marital assets and were appropriately considered by the trial court." Id at 838. 
As in Jefferies, Mr. Thompson's retirement plan accumulated funds during the 
marriage. The funds accumulated in Mr. Thompson's 401(k) during the marriage constitute 
(1) an asset acquired by the parties during the marriage, and (2) a right that accrued during 
the marriage to a present or future benefit. As such, the frill amount of the funds that 
accumulated in Mr. Thompson's 401(k) during the marriage are part of the marital estate 
subject to division by the trial court. The trial court then did not abuse its discretion by 
following the fifty percent presumption and awarding the parties an equal share of the 
accumulated funds. 
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Mr. Thompson cites to Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Hayes 
v. Hayes, 2006 UT App. 289 to support the argument that the trial court should award Mr. 
Thompson the growth on the premarital portion of his 401(k) that accumulated during the 
marriage. These cases stand only for the proposition that separate property should be 
awarded to the owner in the event of divorce, as long as the asset has not become part of the 
marital estate. See Burt. 799 P.2d at 1169; Hayes. 2006 UT App. 289 at * 1. These cases do 
not deal specifically with how the growth of a 401 (k) retirement plan during marriage should 
be divided. As indicated above, Utah has a specific line of authority which provides that the 
full interest in a retirement plan accrued during the marriage is considered a marital asset 
subject to equitable division upon divorce. See, e.g.. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 
431, 432 (Utah 1982); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing equally the marital growth in Mr. 
Thompson's 401(k), as the trial court's approach is rooted in Utah case law. Therefore, the 
trial court's ruling regarding the division of the marital interest in Mr. Thompson's 401(k) 
should be affirmed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING THE EQUAL DIVISION 
OF THE EQUITY IN THE PARTIES' ST. GEORGE HOME. 
The trial court properly characterized the parties' St. George home as marital, subject 
to equal division. Again, Mr. Thompson argues that the trial court was bound by a bright-
line standard that required the trial court to award Mr. Thompson a credit for the proceeds 
from the sale of the California home. (See Brief of the Appellant at 13). Mr. Thompson's 
23 
approach is simply not supported by the law as set forth by Utah appellate courts. This Court 
has stated, in citing to the Utah Supreme Court case of Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 
304, 308 (Utah 1998), that separate property may be considered part of the marital estate 
subject to division when the other spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, 
or protected the separate property. Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Separate property may also become marital property where the separate property has been 
commingled with marital property so that it has lost its separate character, or where the 
separate property has been contributed to the marital estate. Burt. 799 P.2d at 1169. Of 
particular significance is whether the alleged separate property has lost its distinction as 
separate. Id "The thrust of Mortensen is not whether the mere form of the property has 
changed, but whether it has lost its identity as separate property." Id (citing Mortensen. 760 
P.2d at 308) (emphasis in original). 
In this matter, the trial court made the following findings of fact pertaining to the 
parties' St. George home: 
MARITAL HOME 
5. At the time of the parties' marriage in 2002, Respondent 
owned a home in California which was his sole property. 
6. During the next two or three years of marriage, Petitioner 
acquired some community property interest in Respondent's 
California home, but the evidence before the Court does not 
allow this to be quantified. 
7. When the parties moved to Utah in 2005, Respondent 
sold the California home and the parties jointly purchased a 
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home in St. George, Utah. 
8. Title to the Utah home was and is held by both parties as 
joint tenants, and is subject to a joint obligation for a debt 
secured by a trust deed. 
9. The earnest money and down payment on the Utah home 
totaled more than $80,000, and both were paid with funds from 
the proceeds of the sale of Respondent's premarital home in 
California. 
10. The Utah home is a marital asset, in which each party is 
entitled to an equitable share, because the California home 
proceeds have been commingled into the marital estate [Dunn 
v. Dunn is the correct precedent] and because Petitioner had 
some community property interest in the proceeds of the 
California home [....] 
(Addendum 1 at 2-3; R. 206-07). 
Mr. Thompson has failed to challenge any of the trial court's above quoted findings of fact 
in his Appellate Brief. In any case, Mr. Thompson has additionally failed to provide this 
Court with a transcript which would, in any way, allow appellate review of the trial court's 
factual determinations. As such, this Court should accept that the trial court's factual 
determinations were based on sufficient evidence. 
The trial court's findings of fact support its determinations, based on legal authority, 
that the equity in the St. George home is marital property subject to equal division. First, the 
trial court determined that Mrs. Thompson acquired some community property interest in Mr. 
Thompson's California home. Such determination is consistent with California law. In the 
California case of Bare v. Bare. 256 Cal.App.2d 684 (1967), husband owned a home as 
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separate property prior to marriage. 14 at 689. During the marriage, the property remained 
titled in the husband's name, and the husband made payments toward the debt associated 
with the property. Id This continued until the parties eventually divorced. Id. Under these 
facts, the California Court of Appeals determined that "the rule developed through the 
decisions in California gives to the community a pro tanto community property interest in 
such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear 
to the payments made with separate funds." IdL at 690. The Court further went on to 
determine that: 
Where the husband has used community funds to increase his 
separate estate, the court must determine the increase in his 
equity in the home during marriage and also the fair market 
value of the dwelling before and after the marriage. The 
community is entitled to a minimum interest in the property 
represented by the ratio of the community investment to the total 
separate and community investment in the property. In the event 
the fair market value has increased disproportionately to the 
increase in equity, the wife is entitled to participate in that 
increment in a similar proportion. 
Id. Mrs. Thompson had an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the California property 
pursuant to the above analysis. The trial court correctly detemiined that "Petitioner acquired 
some community property interest in Respondent's California home," while acknowledging 
that "the evidence before the Court does not allow this to be quantified." (Addendum 1 at 
1f 6; R. 206). 
In addition, the trial court found that title to the St. George home was and is held by 
both parties as joint tenants, and is subject to a joint obligation for debt secured by a trust 
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deed. (Addendum 1 at f 8; R. 206). Thus, any form or identity of the funds as separate 
property changed from separate to joint and were commingled into the marital estate. A very 
similar scenario was presented to this Court in the case of Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), upon which the trial court explicitly relied in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Addendum 1 at ^ 10. R. 205). In Dunn, husband owned a 
condominium prior to the parties' marriage. Id at 1321. The parties occupied the 
condominium from the time of the marriage until they sold it and used part of the proceeds 
for a cash down payment on their new home and to purchase a joint promissory note. Id. At 
trial, the court granted husband a credit of $22,493.00 that was intended to represent 
husband's premarital equity in the condominium. JdL Wife argued on appeal that husband 
should not have been given the credit for the separate property funds from the condominium 
because the funds were converted to martial property by using them to purchase joint assets. 
See id. This Court reversed the trial court, holding that the award of the premarital funds to 
the husband was an abuse of discretion. Id. In arriving at this decision, this Court in Dunn 
first noted that "[g]enerally, the rule for premarital property is that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage." Id (citing Haumont v. Haumont 793 
P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). This Court determined, as it pertained to the 
proceeds of the condominium husband owned prior to the marriage, that: 
premarital property was consumed and its identification lost 
through commingling and exchanges. The record shows that the 
sale of each credited piece of property resulted in a deposit into 
the parties' joint accounts, or in the case of the condominium, a 
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promissory note in the joint names of the parties. 
Id. This Court went on to determine that '"we therefore hold the trial court's treatment of this 
property as separate property was an abuse of discretion." Id This Court reversed the 
award of credits to the husband for the proceeds from the sale of the condominium. Id 
Just as in Dunn, any contribution to the St. George home that could be characterized 
as Mr. Thompson's separate property lost its identity as separate property as it was 
contributed toward the home that the parties purchased and ov/ned jointly. (Addendum 1 at 
T[ Tl 7-8; R. 206). The fact that the down payment on the St. George property can be 
determined bears no significance. In Dunn, the proceeds of the sale of the condominium that 
husband argued were separate property were determined to be in the amount of $22,493.00. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321. Although husband could "trace" this amount out, this Court still 
determined it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to credit husband that amount 
because the property lost its identity as separate. Id. 
Mr. Thompson relies heavily on the case of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1987). The Newmeyer case does not set forth any lav/ that requires a trial court to 
"back out" separate property from a marital estate. The most significant point from the 
Newmeyer case that applies to this matter is that "trial courts are permitted broad latitude, 
and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it exercises discretion in accordance 
with the standards set forth by this Court." Id. at 1277. It is incumbent on the appealing 
party to provide that the trial court's division violates those standards. IdL In Newmeyer, 
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husband argued that wife should not have been given a credit from the marital estate for 
inheritances she received during the marriage. Id. This Court stated "there is nothing in our 
cases that mandates such a result." Id. The essence of the Newmeyer case, as it applies to 
this matter, is that this Court will not reverse a trial court's division of property as long as the 
trial court acted within standards set forth by this Court. Id at 1277-78. 
Here, the trial court acted within standards set forth by this Court in determining that 
the St. George home was marital property. The trial court determined that the proceeds from 
the sale of Mr. Thompson's California home were commingled into the marital estate, which 
is clearly supported by the trial court's unchallenged factual findings. The trial court's 
determination falls squarely within this Court's legal standards set forth in Burt and Dunn 
that separate property may become commingled into the marital estate. Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166,1169 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321. The trial court's application 
of the uncontested facts of this matter was consistent with this Court's analysis under 
analogous facts in Dunn. 802 P.2d at 1321. Clearly, the trial court was acting within legal 
standards set forth by this Court when it determined that the St. George home is marital 
property. As such, it was within the trial court's discretion to divide equally the equity in the 
home according to the presumption of equal distribution. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. The trial 
court's determinations regarding the St. George home should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is asked to reverse the trial court's determinations pertaining to the division 
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of assets. However, this Court has not been supplied with an adequate record to allow this 
court to review any of the trial court's factual determinations that are at issue on appeal. 
Furthermore, Mr. Thompson has failed to marshal the evidence as he is required to do under 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). In addition, the Court did not commit error in 
applying the legal standards set forth by Utah Appellate Courts in dividing the parties' 
marital property. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce 
entered by the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ i day of November, 2008 
y c -1< L c y^ 
Rick C. Mellen, 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This case came before the Court for trial on January 29, 2008. Petitioner appeared in person 
and was represented by her counsel of record, Rick C. Mellen. Respondent appeared in person and 
was represented by his counsel of record, Shawn T. Farris. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court 
required the parties' counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those 
proposals were received by the deadline, February 11, 2008, and the matter was taken under 
advisement at that time. 
The Court has considered the testimonies of the witnesses, the exhibits received into 
evidence, the arguments of counsel and the parties5 proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Neither party's proposals were entirely acceptable to the Court. Accordingly, the Court now makes 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law1: 
'Notwithstanding the requirement of URCP Rule 52 that "the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon," this Court finds no particular merit in 
the traditional separation of findings of fact from conclusions of law into separate sections, for two 
reasons: First, the separation of a legal conclusion from the facts on which it depends makes reading 
and comprehension unnecessarily difficult. Second, the appellate courts may review and characterize 
a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law without deference to what the trial court has 
called them. Consequently, the Court intends that the "findings'5 and "conclusions" be considered 
as a whole and without regard to technical distinctions among them. 
1. Both parties were residents of Washington County, Utah, for at least three months 
prior to the commencement of this action for divorce. 
2. The parties were married on February 14, 2002 in Palm Springs, California. 
3. Differences have occurred in the parties' relationship that prevent the continuation 
of a viable marriage. Each party should be awarded a divorce from the other on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. 
4. The parties do not have any children in common. Petitioner does have two children 
from a prior marriage. The children lived with the parties during their marriage relationship and 
during the time the parties lived together prior to their marriage relationship, which was for 
approximately two years. 
MARITAL HOME 
5. At the time of the parties' marriage in 2002, Respondent owned a home in California 
which was his sole property. 
6. During the next two or three years of marriage, Petitioner acquired some community 
property interest in Respondent's California home, but the evidence before the Court does not allow 
this to be quantified. 
7. When the parties moved to Utah in 2005, Respondent sold the California home and 
the parties jointly purchased a home in St. George, Utah. 
8. Title to the Utah home was and is held by both parties as joint tenants, and is subject 
to a joint obligation for a debt secured by a trust deed. 
9. The earnest money and down payment on the Utah home totaled more than $80,000, 
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and both were paid with funds from the proceeds of the sale of Respondent's premarital home in 
California. 
10. The Utah home is a marital asset, in which each party is entitled to an equitable share, 
because the California home proceeds have been commingled into the marital estate [Dunn v. Dunn 
is correct precedent] and because Petitioner had some community property interest in the proceeds 
of the California home. 
11. The parties stipulated that the value of the Utah home is $450,000 and that the debt 
thereon is currently about $326,000. 
12. The Utah home should be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the 
parties; in the alternative, either party should be allowed to purchase the interest of the other party 
for $62,000 within the next six months after the entry of the final Decree of Divorce. 
41 OK ACCOUNT 
13. Respondent's 401k retirement account had a value of $68,784 at the time of the 
parties' marriage in 2002. 
14. The 410k account had a value of $177,302 at the time of trial. 
15. The difference of $ 108,518 accumulated during the marriage and is marital property 
[Jeffries v. Jeffries is the correct precedent] and Petitioner should be awarded one-half of that 
accumulated amount. 
SHARES IN SKYWEST 
16. The parties stipulated that 408 shares in Respondent's employer, Sky West, 
constituted marital property. 
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17 Petitioner should be awarded 204 shares 
STOCK OPTIONS 
18 From time to time, Respondent has been able to exercise stock options in connection 
with his employment 
19 Respondent has been able to sell the options and/or stocks purchased and has used 
the proceeds for mantal expenses 
20 Stock options are not guaranteed to Respondent and are not a vested right 
21 The mere possibility of future stock options is not a marital asset which can be 
awarded or divided by the Court 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
22 The evidence was not complete as to all of the parties' premarital and marital personal 
property The evidence was sufficient as to the following items 
Picture in master bathroom 
Picture in bar 
TV in master bedroom 
Computer and printer 
Children's bedroom sets 
Mexican furniture set 
Master bedroom armoire 
Desks and chairs 
Entertainment center "downstairs" 
1993 Oldsmobile, as is 
Ford pickup (subject to debt thereon) 
Dming room set 
One-half of DVD collection 
Subaru vehicle (subject to debt thereon) 
Premarital property of Petitioner | 
Premarital property of Respondent 
Mantal property awarded to Petitioner 
1 
4 
Bar in basement of home 
Two wall paintings 
Pool table 
One-half of DVD collection 
Love seat, sofa, chair (subject to debt thereon) 
62" TV (subject to debt thereon) \ 
ATVs and trailer (subject to debt thereon) 
Washer and dryer (subject to debt thereon) 
Ford vehicle (subject to debt thereon) 1 
1 Marital property awarded to Respondent 
23. All other personal property should be awarded to the party who has possession 
thereof. 
ALIMONY 
24. Petitioner was unemployed at the time of trial, but she was previously employed and 
earning at least $10 per hour until she quit her job and left Utah in late 2007. 
25. Petitioner has good work experience and skills, and has a bachelors degree. 
26. Petitioner is capable of earning at least as much as she did in Utah, which was about 
$1733 per month at her last employment, and she is probably capable of earning much more in 
California where wages are generally higher than in Utah. 
27. Respondent remains employed, and his salary has averaged about $5125 per month 
over the past four years. 
28. Although Respondent has also received income from exercising periodic stock 
options, that income is unpredictable and unreliable. 
29. Petitioner's necessary expenses2 total about $3117 per mo nth, and her debt payments 
2I consider necessary expenses to include those for rent or mortgage, utilities, food and 
household, telephone, vehicle purchase and operation, insurance, and uninsured medical/dental. 
5 
are about $932 more 
30 Respondent's necessary expenses total about $4606, and his debt payments (which 
include large marital debts) are about $660 more 
31 The parties' total gross incomes are less than their total necessary expenses 
32 The parties' total net incomes are far less than their total necessary expenses and 
debts 
33 Each party is in need of support, and neither party is able to pay support for the other 
34 Alimony is not awarded 
ATTORNEY FEES 
35 Neither party is able to pay any amount toward the attorney fees of the other party 
36 The parties should pay their own attorney fees and costs 
37 Petitioner's attorney should submit a final Decree of Divorce which is consistent with 
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
DATED this \\ day of April, 2008 
{^{\^(^ 
G RAND BEACHAM 
District Court Judge 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this '^/ day of ftpvJL , 2008,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each of 
the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's 
Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Rick C. Mellen 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Shawn T. Farris 
Attorney for Respondent 





UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 09 2008 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEOFGE 
STATE OF UTAH 2co8osH6'^«r 
MARTHA I THOMPSON 
Petitioner 
vs 
JAMES A THOMPSON 
Respondent 
JUDGMENT ROLL AND INDEX 
Civil No. 074500408 
Appellate No: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss . 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
I, PATRICIA JORDAN, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the attached 
papers constitute the Judgment Roll and Index and other papers in the 
above-entitled action, that the following is a list of said papers-
Refer to the attached document list 
WITNESS MY HAND THE SEAL OF THIS Court, affixed at 
my office in FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE, STATE OF UTAH, this *4 day 
of S i &*&' i 200J>f_. 
Case 074500408 FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGt 
THOMPSON, MARTHA I vs THOMPSON, JAMES A 


















































































Petition for Divorce 
Acknowledgement of Service 
Answer to Petitioner's Petition for Divorce 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
Substitution of Counsel 
Certificate of Service-Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Proc 
Notice of Mediation 
Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Return of Service 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Return of Servce 
Respondents Motion to Bifurcate and Memorandum in Support Thereof 
Motion for Temporary Orders and Memorandum in Support 
Affidavit oi James A Thompson 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate 
Motion and Memorandum for Order Compelling Discovery 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Orders and Cross Motion anc 
*
 ffidavit of Martha I Thompson 
certificate of Mailing 
Amended Certificate of Hand Delivery for Affidavit of Martha I Thompson 
Amended Certificate of Hand Delivery Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Te 
Second Amended Certificate of Hand Delivery for Affidavit of Martha I Thompson 
Second Amended Certificate of Hand Delivery for Memorandum in Opposition to IV 
Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Cross Motion for Tempor 
Affidavit of James A Thompson 
Request to Submit for Decision 
Request to Submit Form and or/Order (set 1 hr hearing) 
Motion for Temporary Orders 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS 
BENCH TRIAL 
Rule 7(F)(2) Objection to Proposed Order Captioned Temporary Orders Hearing R 
Certificate of Service 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Return of Service 
Certificate of Hand Delivery-Response to Respondent's First Set of Interrogatories 
Subpoena and Return of Service 
Certificate of Mailing 
ENCH TRIAL 
Post Trial Memorandum of Points and Legal Authorities 
Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Case 074500408 FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
THOMPSON, MARTHA I vs THOMPSON, JAMES A 
Document Title 
Trial Brief 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
Notice of Entry of Order 
Notice of Appeal 
Copy of letter to Shawn Fams from Utah Court of Appeals 
Notice of Attorney's Lien 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order Regarding the Sky West Jnc 401 (k) Retiremen 
Notice of Entry of Order 
Respondent's Motion \o Stay Enforcement of Decree Pending Appeal and Memora 
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to S*ay Enforcement of Deere 
Entry Date 
02/20/2008 
04/14/2008 
05/21/2008 
05/22/2008 
06/18/2008 
07/03/2008 
07/09/2008 
07/11/2008 
02/14/2008 
07/23/2008 
08/04/2008 
Page Number 
193 
205 
212 
217 
224 
226 
227 
230 
235 
237 
240 
